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Purge and Politics in the Periphery: Birobidzhan in 1937
Robert Weinberg Recent scholarship on the purges and Great Terror has contributed immensely to our understanding of the stalinist political system that emerged in the mid-1930s. Research by J. Arch Getty and Gabor Rittersporn, among others, has challenged the totalitarian perspective that views the Terror as part of a grand scheme designed by Stalin to silence his opponents in the Party and government, establish his personal dictatorship and coerce society into unquestioning submission.' Instead, these historians emphasize the limits of power and control wielded by the national leadership which found itself at times frustrated in its efforts to impose its will on both society and regional party organizations. They conclude that the "cleansing" of the Party and government was the partial product of a conflict between national and subnational officials, with initiative from below sometimes playing as important a role as central directives in fueling the purges. Among the merits of this research is that it shifts our attention from national elites to regional functionaries, pays close attention to the daily functioning of local politics and distinguishes among the phases of the purge phe- 1. See J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933 -1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 and idem, "Party and Purge in Smnolensk: 1933 -1937 ," Slavic Review 42, no. 1 (1983 URSS, 1933 -1953 (Paris, 1988 ; "Staline en 1938: Apogee du verbe
Slavic Review
This study focuses on an area some five thousand miles to the east, on Birobidzhan, the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR) located along the Chinese border in the Soviet far east. Materials from recently opened party archives in Moscow and Birobidzhan throw into relief the dynamics of the purges in the JAR and add to our understanding of a purge in the making, especially regarding how one ranking party official was swept into the maelstrom of the Great Terror.
The specific purge examined here is that of Matvei Pavlovich Khavkin, Organized settlement of the territory that would become the JAR had begun in 1928 when the government designated it as the national territory of Soviet Jews.4 Given the inflated expectations of the initial five-year plans, officials had grandiose plans for the JAR. However, a host of social, political and economic obstacles worked against mass settlement of the region by large numbers of Jews. By 1937 they comprised only about 20,000 of the approximately 120,000 residents of the JAR. As party chief, Khavkin was responsible for overseeing the overall development of the JAR but, like many counterparts throughout the Soviet Union, he had little success in mobilizing the forces of the Party, government and society to mneet the targets set by government planners in industry, agriculture, housing and culture.
Khavkin's 1937 elimination as party chief in the JAR should be seen in the larger context of the series of internal purges that the Party had conducted within its ranks after the 1933-1934 expulsion of 22 percent of the party's national membership.5 That purge found party members "undesirable" because they undermined and violated party policy, lacked the requisite moral rectitude, or were politically passive, class-aliens or guilty of careerism. Local purge officials were cautioned not to subject rank-and-file members to interrogations of sophisticated questions about the party program and history; they were instructed to reduce to candidate status but not to expel members who lacked sufficient levels of political and ideological education.6 The responses from party m-iembers in the JAR in fall 1933 reveal that many comn- Hereafter cited as PAOEAO. When the obkom held a plenum several days later on 6 April, it decided to "dismiss" (sniat') Khavkin as party secretary and instructed the primary party organization to review his membership. However, the kraikom (kraevoi komitet, leading party organization of the Far Eastern Territory, headquartered in Khabarovsk and immediately superior to the obkom of theJAR) informed the plenum that its action violated Slavic Review party rules since it could not dismiss Khavkin without the preliminary approval of the kraikom. The obkom was annoyed with the kraikom's position but nonetheless agreed to reformulate its resolution to read, "It is impossible for Khavkin to remain at work as first secretary"; it then requested the kraikom to resolve the issue of the "immediate dismissal" (nemedlennoe sniatie) of Khavkin as first secretary.'2
The plenum found Khavkin guilty of encouraging "toadyism, pomposity, political arrogance and intrigue" and urging communists to "attack each other." Moreover, "a widely developed sense of family loyalty and cliquishness (semeistvennost') has led to an absence of collegiality in the obkom, the burying of inner party democracy, the isolation of the obkom from the party masses and the loss in taste for party work." Khavkin surrounded himself "with his own people" whom he 14. Tikhookeanskaia zvezda (11 April 1937 , 26 April 1937 and 9 May 1937 not only did he belong to "an anti-party group" but he delivered "trot- 36. Exhibit at the Museum of the JAR.
37. Suturin writes that "the first steps in beginning to unmask enemies" in the JAR did not occur as a result of "initiative from below, but from massive pressure from above." See "Bez viny vinovatye," Birobidzhanskaia zvezda (12 May, 1989) .
